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Security is a challenging task in software engineering. Traditionally, addressing security 
concerns are considered as an afterthought to the development process and security 
mechanisms are fitted into pre-existing software without considering the consequences 
on the main functionality of the software. Enforcing security policies should be taken 
care of during early phases of the software development life cycle; this benefits the 
development costs and reduces the maintenance time. In addition to cost saving, this 
encourages development of reliable software. Since security related concepts will be 
considered in each step of the design, the implications of inserting such concepts into 
the existing system requirements will help mitigate the defects and vulnerabilities 
present in the system. Although integrating security solutions into every stage of the 
software  development  cycle,  results  in  scattering  and  tangling  of  security  features 
across the entire design. The traditional security hardening approaches are tedious and 
prone to many errors as they involve manual modifications. In this context, the need for 
a systematic way to integrate security aspects/mechanisms into the design phase of the 
development cycle should be considered. 
iv   
In this work, an aspect-oriented modeling approach for specifying and integrating 
security aspects in to Unified Modeling Language (UML) design model is presented. This 
approach allows the security experts to specify generic security aspects and weave them 
into target software base model early in the software development phase. In contrast to 
traditional approaches, model-to-model transformation mechanisms discussed in this 
approach are designed to have an efficient and a fully automatic weaving process. This 
work further discusses additional components that are introduced into the weaving 
process. These  newly introduced components allow  the security experts to provide 
more  appropriate  security  hardening  concepts.  Furthermore,  the  additional 
components are designed based on object-oriented principles and allow the security 
experts  to  exercise  these  principles  in  the  model-to-model  transformation.  The 
additions to the weaver application are tested using the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) 
communicator as a base model. The description of the additional components and the 
results of testing of the weaving process are discussed further in this thesis. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 
Today, computers have impacted all aspects of our lives and have improved the quality 
of life significantly. Computers have emerged into different aspects of our lives. 
Education, telecommunication, health care, transportation, military, and many other 
domains of our society depend heavily on computers and their applications. These 
spectrums of smart devices from simple gadgets like microwave ovens to complex 
satellites have made a profound influence on   the lives of people. These technological 
innovations have made us more productive by keeping us connected even on the move: 
providing audio, video, and data connectivity. , We have computers working in the 
background unobtrusively  aiding us in acquiring, storing, analyzing, understanding large 
amounts of data and appropriately exercising control so as to perform variety tasks be 
it: health monitoring, traffic control, financial transactions, personal entertainment; in a 
timely and efficient manner. 
As these devices become smarter and more powerful the software controlling them also 
 
has grown in its complexity. Competition and market pressures often push out these 
complex systems without thoroughly verifying and validating them.  Consequently, they 
have become susceptible to defects and vulnerabilities. Such high dependency on 
computers and software systems has facilitated the fact that huge amounts of critical 
information  are  now  contained  within  these  systems.    A  lot  of  personal  and  very 
sensitive information is available and is being transferred on data networks between 







dealing with top secret information, a health care package could contain private 
information, social media could contain tons of personal information. In all of these 
scenarios the common man has implicitly started trusting the systems. It becomes 
imperative to maintain and enhance the trust as more and more applications, which 
handles sensitive data are becoming operational every day.  Software Engineering must 
now play a predominant role in the process of building secure and reliable software. 
In  today’s  computing  world,  security  takes  an  increasingly  predominant  role.  The 
 
awareness of security issues has increased among researchers in the software 
engineering community, which has led them to the understanding that although it is 
important to assure that software systems are developed to meet the users' 
requirements, it is also important to assure that these systems are equally secure. The 
industry is facing challenges in public confidence at the discovery of vulnerabilities, and 
customers are expecting security to be delivered out of the box, even on programs that 
were not designed with security in mind. 
One of the primary reasons as to why the current approaches are unsatisfactory is, 
 
Software developers rely heavily on knowledge and experience. The construction of 
such complex software-related systems includes, in brief, requirements engineering, 
design, code implementation and testing, and in all these phase of the software design 
cycle, software engineers do not consider security as a major issue.   Security being 
relatively new, the number of software security experts with the required level of 







the existing number of software developers. Non security experts find it a challenging 
task to define the needed semantics and properties of its requirements. 
Microsoft Security Intelligence Report for 2012 illustrates the vulnerabilities on 
applications that are uncovered since 2002. The report shows software vulnerabilities 
consisting of those that affect Operating systems, Applications, or both. It is difficult to 
draw  a  distinct  line  between  operating  systems  and  applications  vulnerabilities.  In 
Figure 1, vulnerabilities that affect both operating systems and applications are shown 
in red. In this setting, the security engineering of such software-intensive systems has 
become a major concern. This is emphasized by the fact that, in spite of significant 
efforts on  software security from academia and industry, the scale and severity of 
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Figure 1 – Application and Operating System Vulnerability as Described in Microsoft Security Intelligence Report [1] 
Security has been designed and implemented by non-security experts, conventionally; 







They are usually retrofitted into pre-existing designs without the consideration of 
whether this would jeopardize the main functionality of the software and produce 
additional vulnerabilities. The general practice for addressing security concerns is that 
the developers sprinkle the security mechanisms all over the original application. This 
often causes difficulties in tracking the changes and testing the application for 
vulnerabilities and defects. 
It has been shown in recent research [2] that considering the requirements of Security 
 
during the early stages of software development results in more secure and cost 
effective solutions.  It has been shown in Table 1  that costs of repairing a software flaw 
during maintenance is approximately 500 times higher than fixing it earlier in the design 
phase itself. For example, research conducted by Cigital shows an average cost savings 
of over $2.1 million (on a code base of 2 million LOC) when vulnerabilities are identified 
during development, where source code analysis is most often leveraged [3] as 
illustrated in  Table 1. 
 
 
Fixing Bugs Later Fixing Bugs Earlier 
















Requirements  $139  Requirements  $139  
Design  $455  Design  $455  
Coding  $977  Coding 200 $977 $195,400 
Testing 50 $7,136 $356,800 Testing  $7,136  
Maintenance 150 $14,102 $21,115 Maintenance  $14,102  
Total 200 $22,809 $377,915 Total 200 $22,809 $195,400 
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Figure 2, concisely presents the manner in which the quanta of introduction of errors, 
detection of errors, and the cost incurred for repair (per error), and varies during the 
software development lifecycle of a typical application. By analyzing the graph we can 
conclude that higher the percentage of errors addressed during the design phase the 
cost of fixing remnant bugs that are uncovered in later stages decreases very rapidly. 
We can gather from Figure 2 that the percentage of detected errors during the design 
phase of the lifecycle is approximately 15% and the cost of fixing these flaws and 
vulnerabilities at this stage is very low compared to fixing these flaws during the testing 
phase. 
Nowadays, the challenge is even greater when legacy systems must be adapted to fit 
into high-risk environments. Software maintainers must face the challenge to improve 







be done to improve the situation, especially for Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) 
software products that are no longer supported, or their source code is lost. However, 
whenever the source code is available, as it is the case for Free and Open-Source 
Software (FOSS), a wide range of security improvements could be applied once a focus 
on security is decided. As a result, integrating security into software is becoming a very 
challenging and interesting domain of research. 
In this thesis, we introduce an approach to tackle correcting the security flaws in the 
 
earlier stages of the design. In order to address security concerns throughout the 
development life cycle, we have adopted the use of “Security hardening”. As the term 
suggests, we already have a working system and known security issues that have to be 
strengthened. To do the “security hardening” right, it should be conceptualized in the 
beginning of the system development process itself. Therefore, we use the prevalent 
concepts of Model Driven Architecture (MDA) [5] paradigm and the Unified Modeling 
Language (UML) [6]. 
MDA is an architecture using object technology, to distribute application integration, by 
 
guaranteeing reusability of components, interoperability & portability, basis in 
commercially available software [5]. Model-driven architecture is developed by the 
Object Modeling Group (OMG) to produce code from abstract models. These Models 
are designed to elaborate the system structurally and behaviorally using the OMG 
standardized modeling language such as UML. 
UML is a standardized general-purpose modeling language in object-oriented software 
 







an object-oriented software-intensive system under development [6]. Systems Modeling 
Language (SysML) is a subset of UML, which is a general-purpose modeling language for 
systems engineering applications. 
UML profiles are a specialized set of rules. These profiles are used when there is a need 
 
to define a new language to model a system that either restricts the number of UML 
elements or adds some constraints or modifies them while respecting the original 
semantics. UML elements can easily be customized by using extensions provided by 
UML [7]. 
Utilizing these concepts towards integrating security solutions at the software modeling 
level may result in the scattering and tangling of security features throughout the entire 
software  models.  To  address  these  issues,  Aspect-Oriented  Modeling  (AOM) 
[8]paradigm emerges as an appropriate approach for security hardening at the software 
modeling level by using these aspects at different stages of software development. The 
concept of AOM is to merge the existing concepts of aspect-oriented paradigm to find 
and  define  essential characteristics of  crosscutting concerns  in  UML models, 
composition of such models that have common oriented aspects from a more abstract 
level. Using AOM we can assist security experts in designing security mechanisms in 
isolation without altering the logic of the application. Besides, using AOM, developers 
with limited security knowledge can systematically integrate those security mechanisms 
into their software models. 
Aspect Oriented Programming (AOP) paradigm defines concepts like pointcuts, join 







set of points in the application flow to inject advices. The selected points that are 
matched for the targeted application are called join points. An advice is a piece of code, 
or behavior, that is injected into the target application when the application reaches the 
given join point during execution. Additionally, the process of injecting the advice into 
the application is commonly called weaving. Furthermore, other than advices, aspects 
contain a set of pointcuts and introductions. 
 
This thesis is part of the research initiative supported by Ericsson Canada Software 
Research. This cooperation program aims at developing a Model-Based Framework for 
Engineering Secure Software and System (MOBS2). The targeted security concerns are: 
capturing security requirements, specification and design of security mechanisms, 
verification and validation of security properties/policies, and automatic generation of 
secure code. In the following section, we enumerate the objectives of this research work 





The main objective of this thesis consists of elaborating an approach for systematic 
integration of security requirements by defining new join points and advices and adding 
them into the MOBS2 framework in order to apply them during the design phase. This is 
achieved by expanding the specified UML profile by designing new aspects for security 
hardening. We also expand the weaving framework for the injection of security aspects 







 Elaborating a framework for specifying new security aspects and their systematic 
integration into UML models. 
 Designing and implementing the proposed aspects. 
 
 Validating the implemented aspects through various case studies. 
 
In addition, the integrating procedures need to be transparent to the developer; this 
means that the proposed approach should be automated as much as possible in order 
to hide the complexity and enable a smooth learning curve of our approach. 
 
1.2.  Contributions 
 
This section lists the main contributions of this thesis in relation to the objectives stated 
above. The main contributions of this thesis are: 
 
 Expanding UML profile to specify new security requirements as aspects over 
design models. 
 Elaborating the model transformation rules that allow for weaving the proposed 
security aspects into UML design models. 
 Designing and implementing the proposed security aspects over UML models 
within Rational Software Architect environment. 











In this section we briefly describe the framework used in this thesis. The framework 
required an environment with a powerful UML modeler to aid the developer to create 

























Figure 3 – MOBS2 Framework Overview [49] 
 
Software Architect (RSA).  The main components of the framework are illustrated in 
Figure 3.   The framework comprises of three major components: The first one is the 
UML security aspects tailored by the security experts armed with a detailed list of all 
security requirements. Additionally, these experts design appropriate aspects into 
security aspect libraries in terms of UML concepts. This component is responsible to 
translate the security requirements into models and properties. The Developers utilize 
the second component to construct the rules for the weaving interface to create the 
joint-points and the advices that are required to incorporate the proposed security 
aspects into the base UML models. Also this component is utilized by the developer to 
design the pointcuts into the weaving interface using the Object Constraint Language 
(OCL) and the Query View Transformation (QVT) language. The third component is the 







transforming  the  unsecure  UML  models  by  adding  security  features  into  the  UML 
models, and generating the secure UML model. This unit comes as part of the IBM RSA 
and its elements are accessed using the eclipse plug-ins. 
 
1.4. Structure of the Thesis 
 
 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: 
 
 Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical background literature of the concepts of modeling 
languages, aspect–oriented modeling, and the unified modeling language. 
 Chapter 3 describes in detail the MOBS2 Framework and the various components. It 
also describes several UML artifacts and tools utilized to support the framework. 
 Chapter  4  presents  the  design  of  new  security  aspects  for  both  structural  and 
behavioral UML models. The chapter also describes the semantics of these newly 
designed aspects and their outcome on the UML base models. 
 Chapter 5 describes the impact of the aspects fabricated in this thesis. The case 
studies includes Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) for the security model, a cross- 
section of Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Communicator base model 







Chapter 2 Literature Survey 
 
 
In this chapter, the primary concepts utilized are briefly explained and relevant work in 
this area is described. The core idea of the work is to support the incorporation of 
security concepts at the highest level that is the model level. The modeling language 
used in this thesis is UML as it is very popular and has been extensively adopted by the 
industry.  The philosophy of the whole work is to let the security experts do their part of 
the hardening activity without requiring to have too much of in-depth knowledge of the 
functionality of the software. This naturally allows us to adopt the Aspect-Oriented 
paradigm. Security and functionalities can be modeled independently and then stitched 
together. In this context the chapter begins by discussing the concepts of software 
security. Then, we discuss UML modeling and its concepts. Afterwards we discuss the 
aspect-oriented paradigm concepts and how these concepts can be combined. 
 
2.1. Software Security 
 
 
Software security encompasses measures taken throughout the software's life-cycle to 
prevent  breach  of  the  security  through  flaws  found  in  the design, development, 
deployment  or maintenance phases  of  the  software.  The  prerequisites  for  software 
artifacts to exhibit secure properties [9] are: 
a.   Transparency: Disclosure of all functions of the software to the user. i.e. there is 
 
no hidden agenda. 
 
b.  Obedience: The software follows only the directions given by  its controlling 







c.   Purity: The software performs only the actions that it has advertised to the user 
and performs no unrelated functions. 
d.   Loyalty: The  software serves only  the interests of the authorized controlling 
entities and cannot be subverted to perform functions for some other entity. 
Once it is ascertained that the software entity is “well-behaved”, the security features 
can be incorporated into the software [10]. Typical attributes of secure software that 
are visible to the user are [10]: 
a.   Authentication – Ensure that the user of the software (either machine or human 
 
user) is the entity it claims to be. 
 
b.   Authorization – Ensure that the authenticated user has sufficient privilege to 
perform the intended function. 
c.  Audit  –  Be able  to trace every action performed by  the software entity by 
maintaining appropriate logs of all transactions (possibly critical ones only). 
d.  Confidentiality  –  Disclose  the  sensitive  information  only  to  the  authorized 
entities. 
e.   Integrity  –  Prevent  unauthorized  or  improper  modification  of  systems  and 
information. 
f. Dependability : 
 
i. Reliability – The software performs its assigned tasks without any failure 
and provides the same results for the same set of inputs all the time. 









g.   Non-Repudiation:  Maintaining irrefutable proof of a transaction for both parties 
that have participated in the transaction. This requires audit trails to be 
maintained [11]. 
 
2.2. Unified Modeling Language (UML) 
 
 
The development of any large non-trivial system is a very complex task. Typically, large 
systems will use diverse sets of agents for completing their tasks.  To satisfy these tasks 
the system has to be utilized effectively. At the beginning of the project, the 
requirements of each stakeholder will have to be captured and documented. At this 
stage, in order to ensure that requirements have been captured accurately and even 
during the design and implementation phase, it is a commonly accepted engineering 
practice to build models. These could be either hard models like small scale versions of 
planes or soft models like building plans etc. These models are created to study and 
analyze various characteristics of the target system in order to ensure that all critical 
requirements can be satisfied once the system is realized. Various types of models of 
the system can be created each highlighting a set of aspects of its proposed behavior. 
These can then be vetted by the stakeholders and would serve as an appropriate launch 
point for the detailed development phase. With the advent of high performance 
computer-based tools and their easy availability, it has become practical to develop high 
fidelity models and even simulate them in order to understand and capture the critical 
performance parameters. Building large Software systems is no different. The concept 







OMG  standardized  and  promulgated  a  modeling  language;  known  as  the  Unified 
 
Modeling Language (UML) in 1997. 
 
It was called the unified modeling language as predated to it there were different 
modeling languages being used by different research groups; most active proponents of 
this were Jim Raumbaug, Grady Booch and Ivan Jacobson [12] who had evolved their 
own modeling notations named OOSE, Booch, and OMT [12], respectively.  UML is a 
standard language for specifying, visualizing, building the software artifacts that 
constitutes the system being developed. It also serves as a good documentation 
mechanism. Due to the existence of this standard, it has now been adopted as the ideal 
vehicle for technical exchange of design information by groups/teams of software 
developers. UML however, neither is a methodology, nor does it prescribe any particular 
process, nor is it a programming language. 
To understand UML, a  conceptual model has to be  formed that portrays the basic 
 
elements. These elements are known as UML basic building blocks. The building blocks 
of UML are: Things which are the abstractions that are the objects in a model. Objects 
are the basic building blocks used to create a well-formed model of the application; 
relationships tie these objects together. Relationships are the basic relational building 
blocks of UML, and lastly diagrams group the interesting collections of the objects. 
Diagrams are the graphical representations of these elements mostly rendered in a 
graph where the vertices are the objects and the arcs are the relationships [12]. 
A system’s architecture is the most important artifact that can be used to manage the 







incremental development of a system throughout the software development life cycle. 
The UML architecture should portray the organization of a software system, a proper 
selection  of  elements  and  their  interfaces  to  compose  the  system  along  with  the 
behavior in collaboration and finally the architectural style that guide the organization. 
Figure 4 illustrates the views that best describe the architecture of a software-intensive 
system each of these views is a projection into the organization and structure of the 











































Figure 4 - Different UML Views [12] 
 
As illustrated in Figure 4, the use case view of a system describes its behavior as seen by 
the different users. With UML, the static aspects of this view are captured in use case 
diagrams, class diagrams, package diagrams, object diagrams and many other diagrams; 
the dynamic aspects of this view are captured in the interaction diagrams, state chart 
diagrams and activity diagram. The design view of a system encompasses the functional 
requirements of the system objects that form the vocabulary of the system. The design 
views are captured in class diagrams and object diagrams. The process view of a system 
encompasses   the   process   that   forms   the   system’s   parallel   and   synchronization 







used for the purpose of configuration and assembling the system and is depicted in the 
component diagrams. The deployment view focuses on the system topology on which 
the built system has to run. This view is depicted by deployment diagrams. Each of these 
views can stand alone and show different perspective to different stakeholders. With 
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Figure 5 - UML Diagrams [12] 
 
Figure 5 shows the different UML diagrams that are used by these stakeholders. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 5 , UML Diagrams are of several different types they are [12]: 
 
 Use case diagram captures system functionality as seen by users. It is built in early 
stages of development by system analysts and domain experts interactively with the 
users. Its purpose is to specify the context of a system; capture the requirements of 
a system; validate a system’s architecture, drive implementation, and generate test 
cases. 
 Class diagram captures the vocabulary of the system. It depicts the model elements 
 







main purpose is to gather the required concepts and associate unique names for 
these entities; depict the collaborations that are required between the various 
entities and the constraints imposed on these entities, and finally group the entities 
that together will form the logical database schema for the system. 
 Object diagram captures the instances of the various data entities and inter-relating 
 
links. This is built by the analysts, designers and implementers.   Its purpose is to 
depict the structure of  the various  objects  and data  entities in the system and 
capture the instances of the interaction between the various entities as snapshots. 
 Component Diagram is developed by architects to provide information/specification 
 
to the programmers. It maps the logical structure to the physical structures that 
have to be implemented. The main purpose is to specify the physical database and 
construct the executables. 
 State Machine diagram captures the “states” of the various objects/components of 
 
the system. It is also built by the architects and specified to the programmers. The 
main purpose is to define the various operating modes i.e. the dynamic behavior of 
the  system  entities;  define  the  data/events  that  effect  transition  between  the 
various states/modes of the object and also define the start state of each object and 
hence the system. 
 Sequence diagram captures the interactions between the entities in a chronological 
 
order  and  also  depicts  the  dependencies  between  the  various  events.  It  also 
captures the dynamic behavior of the various system entities. It is usually created by 







 Activity diagram depicts the whole system as a composition of activities and shows 
the flow/sequence of these activities that will be pursued in order to achieve the 
functionality. 
 Deployment  diagram  maps  the  complete  software  system  onto  the  physical 
hardware  structure.  It  captures  the  various  physical  nodes  and  their 
interconnections that work collaboratively in order to perform the tasks. 
Table 2 provides a brief description of all these diagrams. One can note that each 
diagram has a different purpose and a precise strength for performing particular tasks 
inside the software development process. Choosing the right set of diagrams to model a 
system is very important to make the design understandable and approachable. 
 
 
UML Diagrams Represents 
Use-Case System functionality from the user's viewpoint 
Activity A sequence of actions of a flow within the system 
Class Class, entities, business domain, database 
Sequence Interactions between objects 
Interaction Overview Interactions at a general high level 
Communication Interactions between objects 
Objects Objects and their links 
State Machine The run time life cycle of an object 
Composite Structure Component of object behavior at run time 
Component Executables linkable libraries 
Deployment Hardware nodes and processor 
Package Subsystems, organization units 
 







UML is defined as an open-ended modeling language, which could be extended with 
new entities i.e. building blocks, new properties, and semantics so as to customize it to 
various problem domains. The extensibility mechanisms defined for UML are: 
stereotypes, tagged values and constraints [13] [15], and they can be described as 
follows: 
    Stereotypes: These define an extension mechanism based on which one can derive a 
 
new model element in the lines of an existing one. It can inherit some properties of 
the parent element and also have some very specific properties meaningful for the 
particular problem domain. With these primitives and basic modeling elements the 
problem domain can be better captured and visualized. This forms the basis for 
creating various profiles of the system. For example, exceptions in Java can be cast 
as a stereotype that can then be customized to the behavior that is meaningful in 
the particular problem domain instead of “one solution suits all” kind of handling of 
exceptions. 
    Tagged  Value:  This  specifies  attributes  of  the  model  element  and  also  values 
 
associated  with  them.  This  could  be  associated  with  stereotypes  so  that  the 
extension based on the stereotype can also inherit these values. This should be 
treated more as metadata as it is not instance dependent. Examples are association 
of say a particular language compiler with the object or versioning of the element, 
which does not depend on a particular instantiation of the object. 
    Constraints: These are properties, which define assertions that have to be true at all 
 







blocks can be enhanced with new rules or modification of existing rules with this 
feature. This, for instance, could be a method of capturing timing constraints or 
deadlines for various tasks in a hard real-time system. OMG has defined the Object 
Constraint language (OCL) to express these constraints on models elements. 
 
2.2.        Aspect-Oriented Paradigm 
 
 
The idea of Separation of Concerns (SoC) has its origin in the evolution of the ideas of 
encapsulation so that visibility is limited to the interfaces required for manipulating the 
information without worrying about the internal architecture of the particular entity 
[16]. The aspect-oriented paradigms and specifically the Aspect-Oriented Software 
Development (AOSD) methodology enhances these concepts and presents 
modularization in ways which ease the task of cross-cutting concerns. A concern in this 
context is basically a property that is critical or important for a particular stakeholder. A 
particular system will have different stakeholders and each of them will have certain 
concerns. Core concerns of a module can be usually realized using standard OOP 
techniques [17] where this concern can be implemented in a single module with 
adequate encapsulation. However, there are certain functionalities of the system such 
as performance monitoring, concurrency control, transaction management, and security 
that  cannot  be  captured  or  localized  in  just  one  module  and  will  have  to  be 
implemented in various modules of the system. This concern therefore is a cross-cutting 
concern that spans quite a few modules and gets implemented in a distributed manner. 
Conventional way of implementing it would have a sprinkling of the code all over the 







be addressed. The concept of aspect-oriented programming evolved to address such 
cross-cutting concerns. Here, each of these cross-cutting concerns can be viewed 
independently of the actual functionality of the system and appropriate design and 
implementation can be evolved to satisfy this concern. A language, which has constructs 
for specifying the core concerns as well as the cross-cutting concerns of the system is 
necessary for supporting this design methodology.   The language should also be 
implemented so that the code that will be generated to address the above concerns will 
adhere to the language specification and will translate to code, which will execute as 
desired. The idea is that the concerns are specified and then each of these implemented 
concerns will have to be weaved along with the modules that implement the core 
concerns to realize the final system. This requires that a set of weaving rules be defined 
based on which the modules can be stitched together. The core and the cross-cutting 
concerns are normally implemented using standard object-oriented languages like C++ 
and Java. The weaving rules will have to specify “where and what” has to be weaved 
into the particular section of the code so as to achieve the desired functionality. The 
system exposes certain points in its execution such as execution of methods, 
communication between tasks, exceptions, creation of objects or destruction of objects, 
etc. These identifiable points are defined as join points. Next, support is required for 
selecting  the  particular join-point  into  which  the  code  corresponding  to  the  cross- 
cutting concerns will have to be weaved. Such specification is called pointcuts. Once the 
join point has been identified then the particular code, which modifies the behavior of 







specified. This advice can be invoked before the execution of the code at the join-point 
or after or instead of it. Such power of expressiveness allows fairly complex behavioral 
modifications to be implemented in the system. The advice that needs to be stitched 
together with the main code will itself be captured in an entity called the aspect. To 
summarize, the implementation of the cross-cutting concerns are captured as advices in 
modules called aspects, the points in the code where the advice has to be weaved are 
specified as pointcuts and the places where the system is amenable to behavioral 
modification are the join-points of the system. The primary driving factor for adopting 
AOP for developing secure software is that security is normally a cross-cutting concern. 
An introduction of information access control may have to be enforced wherever the 
information is  being  accessed in the application  .For example, in  a  banking  system 
shown in Figure 6. A simple banking application showing the working of an ATM module, 
connecting  to  a  bank  module  to  the  provide  account  holder  information.  The 
accounting, ATM and database modules may have to utilize the services of the security 
module in a number of places. With the result though the particular interface to the 
security module might be defined by an API, the calls to this Security API is sprinkled all 
over the application in various modules. This leads to tangling of the code. Also 




















+Connect ( ): boolean 




   


























- Pin : int 
+Withdraw (float): void 





Figure 6 – Simple Banking Module [17] 
 
Adoption of AOP would be very natural in such a situation. In this case the functionality 
to satisfy the cross-cutting concerns will be in one module called security module that 
logically interacts with the other modules shown in Figure 7. 
The join points in each of these modules will be specified and when encountered, based 
 
on the pointcut criteria, the corresponding advices contained in the security aspect will 
be woven into the modules. All interactions with the security module per-se are 
contained in the particular security aspect. Any changes done to the security module 
will only result in the modification of the security aspect, but not the other modules. 
In spite of the inherent advantages of the AOP methodology for addressing security 
 
concerns, there are certain drawbacks [19] that are present in the system namely 
isolation of faults is difficult as the fault could be in either the source code of the main 

















-AccNum:  String 
-Name: String 
-PIN: String  
+Connect  ( ): boolean 
+Action (String): void 
+Authenticate ( ): void 







-Loca tion: String 
+AccountD etails ( ): void 
   
SavingsAccount 
   



































-Value: floa t 
- Pin : int 
+Withdraw (floa t): void 








Figure 7 – Banking Example with a Security Module [18] 
 
Another issue is when there are many to many relationships between aspects and the 
primary modules then understandability becomes difficult as all interactions will have to 
be  understood  by  each  of  the  implementers  of  the  module.     In  spite  of  these 
deficiencies, the AOP methodology has come to be widely accepted in the recent past. 
Keshnee et al. [19] have established various categories of aspect-oriented security 
research. 
The major categories identified are:   access control and authentication, cryptographic 
 







verification and security software engineering. In the following, we briefly discuss each 
category: 
 Access  Control  and  Authentication:  Access  policies  have  to  be  enunciated  and 
 
implemented so that every access to the “secured entity” will be controlled using 
these policies. Various types of architectures for implementing this are proposed 
[20] defining an “Enforcement Agent” who will be approached for mediation when 
an access to the “secured entity” is attempted. Another proposed approach is to 
specify the “secured entity” in a container and manage access to the container using 
the predefined policies.  Research in this area has also focused on discretionary 
access controls [21], role-based access control [22] and mandatory access control 
[23]. 
 Cryptographic Controls: In this category, the information that has to be accessed, 
 
modified or transferred is kept in an encrypted form. This ensures that the data is 
visible only for the people with appropriate access rights as they alone will have the 
method of decrypting the code, thus maintaining its confidentiality. Assurance can 
be given about the authenticity of the information, and its integrity too. The AOP 
methodology enables the data-items to be securely hardened using appropriate 
encryption aspect accessing a security module. Without having to modify the 
application module, security measures can be enforced [19]. 
 Information  Flow  Controls: These  will  basically  ensure  that  information  will  be 
 
available only to the authentic software objects. The information flow can be 







defined point-cuts can specify appropriate join points before or after data transfer. 
Advices at these join points can verify the authenticity of the destination or source 
of information as the case may be and also perform sanity checks in order to ensure 
that information meets the constraints that might be imposed on these data 
transfers. 
 Protection  from  Invasive  Software:  AOP  has  been  adopted  in  performing  this 
 
function where an advice when invoked will perform self-checks so as to ensure that 
the target module has not been modified. This could be done using verification 
techniques,  which  may  depend  on  the  various  types  and  instances  of  invasion 
against which the software has to be hardened. 
 Security  Kernels:  A  security  kernel  is   defined  to  be  the   hardware/software 
 
component that implements the concept of a reference monitor. The objective of 
the security kernel is to integrate the security mechanisms into a part of the 
operating system [24]. Using the concept of AOP, it is possible to upgrade or modify 
the security enforcing mechanisms dynamically as needed to ensure the security of 
the system [25] [19]. 
 Verification: AOP techniques have been used in the process of verification where it 
 
has  to  be  ensured  that  the  data  entities  generated  by  the  system  obey  the 
constraints imposed on them.   This could be implemented by creating specific 
validation agents who verify the compliance. These validation agents can be 
introduced using the AOP paradigm and then can be modified in order to enforce 







 Security Software Engineering: This deals with all phases of the lifecycle of software 
development straight from the elucidation of requirements to the implementation 
and deployment [19]. AOP has been found very useful because using this 
methodology; the application modules are divorced from the security module as 
there is a strong separation of concerns. The security module implements all the 
security mechanisms and the security aspect module contains all the advices that 
are weaved into the application module appropriately. Since the security issues are 
not handled in multiple modules, it will be easy to reason about the correctness of 
the security system during all phases of the development lifecycle. 
 
2.3. Aspect-Oriented Modeling with UML 
 
 
Over the last decade, AOM is moving from being a work of curiosity to actual usage 
where a number of diverse stakeholders have to contribute in building the system. The 
adoption of AO principles early in the development process chain will allow subject 
experts to function fairly independently from the beginning. They can independently 
conceptualize and easily prove correctness even at higher levels of abstraction.  UML, 
being  a  widely  accepted  high-level  object-oriented  modeling  language,  becomes  a 
natural choice for supporting the AOM methodology. In the following, some of the 
important contributions in the area of AOM using UML are reviewed. 
Theme [26] is one of the approaches, which proposes the adoption of AOM straight 
from the Requirement analysis phase. Theme has two components: Theme/Doc and 
Theme/UML.   Theme/Doc supports  visualizing  requirements specifications  and their 







cutting functionalities can be defined and the point-cuts identified. The main focus has 
been to discover ‘aspects’ from requirements. The requirement specification is analyzed 
and the actions and their interconnections are extracted from it. The requirements and 
actions are usually many-to-many relationships. The shared requirements are the 
aspects. Once all the requirements are analyzed and mapped, they are split into groups. 
Groups that are self-contained constitute the base, while the groups that have links with 
other groups show the cross-cutting concerns. Theme/UML models features and aspects 
of the system along with the scheme of combining them. The main achievement is that 
traceability from requirements to views of requirements (Theme/DOC) to UML models 
(Theme/UML) is supported.  Fuentes et al. [27] have proposed certain generic UML2 
meta-models. Each meta-model is a composition of four core packages namely, entities 
for defining aspects, join points for identification of execution points at which 
interception can happen, AO-behavior for specifying the behavior that needs to be 
introduced  at  the  join  points,  and  aspect  composition  rules,  which  define  the 
relationship between the join points and the aspects. Extra packages can be added in 
order to model for instance the introduction of new methods to classes, and adding 
interfaces to classes etc. These can supplement the core packages to better model the 
system. They have also mapped the UML-2 elements into these essential entities of 
AOP. The containers and components can be used for modeling aspects. Stereotypes or 
classifiers can be used to model the behavioral and structural features of aspects. The 
relationship between aspects and the base model can be depicted using association and 







aspects and the classes. Hooks can be used for defining join points. These define some 
possible mappings between the UML2 constructs and those that are needed to 
implement AO in the software design phase. However, neither implementation of these 
concepts, nor a suitable development environment has been reported. Similarly, Gupta 
et al. [28] have proposed extensions to UML based on the meta-model concept for 
providing support for aspects and modularization of cross-cutting concerns by adding 
elements to UML to represent point-cuts, join-points, advices, classes and aspects. 
However, their work is limited to a few of the UML artifacts and they do not provide any 
integrated environment for their work. They have however demonstrated the efficacy of 
their approach using a case study. Cottenier et al. [29] have studied the problem of 
cross cutting concerns in the context of distributed and embedded systems. They also 
promote the concept of meta-model to represent composition semantics. They have 
defined a model weaver, called SDL, for state-charts, which serves primarily to simulate 
and validate the design of state-charts. The work presented in [29] is confined to only 
few artifacts of UML.   Aldawud et al. [14] define generic profiles in UML to support 
AOSD. Profiles are basically predefined set of extension mechanisms for a particular 
domain, technology or methodology.  The typical extension mechanisms of stereotypes, 
tagged values, and constraints have been utilized to evolve profiles specifically for 
satisfying the needs of AOSD. They classify aspects as synchronous and asynchronous. 
Synchronous aspects are those for which the associated advice modifies the behavior of 
the core class. The asynchronous ones are basically self-contained functions which are 







defined as dependencies and associations. They have also defined profiles for 
collaboration diagrams and state-charts. They have used constructs of AspectJ [30] for 
realization of these concepts. The authors have stated that these profiles have enabled 
bridging the gap between OO and AO. However, standardization requires a lot more 
effort.    Bustos et al. [31] propose class diagrams and sequence diagrams to represent 
the static and dynamic views. State diagrams are used to represent the advice. They 
propose this to build formalism into the process so that proving correctness gets 
simplified. They propose to introduce these formalisms into the early stages of the 
software development cycle itself.  Similarly, Pawlak et al. [32] defines point-cuts as 
relations to pointcuts, and aspect classes.  The aspect classes would contain the advice 
that needs to be incorporated at the appropriate point-cut. The point-cut relationship 
establishes the mapping between the base class and the advice.  They have defined the 
concepts at a high level and are planning to support the full AO model lifecycle in future. 
Basch et Al. [33] propose a scheme where aspects and components are separated using 
encapsulation into different packages. Each aspect package is self-contained and has its 
own class. They also proposed an additional modeling element for depicting the join 
points in the main application model. These were recommended for incorporation into 
the standard. The concepts have been explained using graphical representations but this 
process of actually implementing them into a tool has not been dealt with in the paper. 
The paper also does not report any activity towards the development of a complete 
development environment using these concepts. Kande et al. [34] argue the case for 







capturing ‘aspects’ at the UML-level. They examine suitability of UML for the purpose of 
software system modeling. UML supports model refinement with features like 
stereotypes, tagged values, and constraints. Constraints are expressed using OCL. 
Suitability of UML for AOP concepts is examined by drawing parallels between AOP and 
UML constructs. This has been examined in the context of ASpectJ and its constructs. 
Method calls are the most convenient and intuitive join points. Introduction of 
interceptor classes can help in injecting advices at the appropriate points. Mediation is 
done at connection points into which the advices can be weaved during weaving. This 
will modularize even at higher levels of abstraction. They propose definition of new 
stereotypes of UML to enable new aspect classifiers. 
Khan et al. [35] have comprehensively  surveyed important research work performed in 
 
this domain of providing extensions of UML for modeling AOS recently. They have 
defined certain evaluation criteria for determining the suitability of the various methods 
to provide all the desirable features. These are: Coverage- the extent to which AOP 
techniques are covered by the constructs; Supported AOP constructs; UML Artifacts- a 
list of artifacts that are extended to model the AOP SW; Case study- whether certain 
case  studies  have  been  implemented  using  the  techniques;  Adherence  to  UML 
standards; Modeling of the weaving process and supporting language. The authors have 
studied the existing approaches and classified them based on the above criteria. They 
have come to a conclusion that none of the proposals meet all the above listed criteria 







2.4. Query/View/Transformation (QVT) 
 
 
QVT (Query/View/Transformation) is the standard defined by OMG for model 
transformation. It consists of three components: two declarative (relations and core) 
and one imperative (operational mappings). The relations language implements the 
transformation by providing links that identify relations between elements in the source 
model to elements in the target model. The core language is also a declarative language; 
it is simpler than the relations language. It is actually used to specify the semantics of 
the relations language. These two languages are good for simple transformations where 
the source model and the target model have a similar structure. However, when it 
comes to more complicated and sophisticated transformations where elements in the 
target model are being built with no direct correspondence with elements in the source 
model, declarative languages can be a limitation. Thus, the need for an imperative 
language becomes a must. Therefore, QVT proposed the third language, which is the 
operational QVT. 
 
2.5. Related Work on Weaving and UML Secure Design 
 
 
In this section we review the work closely related to secure design. We begin the section 
by discussing the current weaver tools that are developed. Then further on, we discuss 
the work related to UML Secure Design and AOM. 
 
2.5.1.  Weavers 
 
Various approaches have been proposed for weaving aspects into UML design models. 







selected by pointcuts. In Figure 8, an overview of a weaver tool is illustrated. Commonly, 
the weaver tool has the base models, aspect models, and the identified joint points as 
inputs.  The  combined  output,  which  is  the  woven  model,  is  produced  for  further 
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Join-Point M atching Mecha nisms 
 
 
Figure 8 – Weaver Overview [36] [37] 
 
In this section, we present the relevant work done on the weaver tool. Zhang et al [38] 
present Motorola WEAVR; an AOM plug-in for weaving aspects into executable UML 
state machine models. The weaving process involves two phases: advice instantiation 
and advice instance binding. During the first phase, advices are instantiated based on 
the pointcuts defined. Then, the matched join points are linked to their corresponding 
advices. During phase two, the aspects are woven into the base models. Motorola 
WEAVR supports two types of join points that are action and transition join points. 
Aspect interference is handled by allowing precedence relationships to be specified at 
the modeling level. This weaver is tool-dependent, not portable and lacks graphical 
representation of the woven models. Fuentes and Sanchez [36] proposed a weaving 







the models. Using XPATH (for join points selection) and XSLT (for advices injection), a 
XMI representation is generated from the output model. This weaver does not support 
graphical representation of the woven model. However, this approach targets only 
executable UML models. 
Morin et al. present the GeKo [39], a generic model weaver. GeKo supports weaving of 
 
class diagrams, state machine diagrams, and sequence diagrams. The weaving is 
implemented  as  model  transformations  using  Kermeta  language  [83].  The  GeKo 
approach is based on the definition of mappings between the different views of an 
aspect, based on graphical syntax associated to the domain specific frameworks. The 
tool  uses  Prolog-based  patterns  matching  to  automatically  identify  the  join-points. 
GeKo, which is still under development, keeps the graphical representation of the 
weaving between an aspect model and the base model. 
Groher and Voelter [40] present the XWeave; a weaver that supports the weaving of 
 
models and meta-models. The weaver is implemented as a model-to-model 
transformation using OpenArchitectureWare and it is based on the Eclipse Modeling 
Framework (EMF) [40]. The tool selects the join points by: matching the name of the 
element in the aspect model with the element in the base model or by explicit pointcut 
expression specified in  the OAW to select elements of the base  model.  XWeave is 
limited only to the addition of new model elements to the base model. It does not 
support removing or replacing existing base model elements. In summary, most of 
existing work on model weaving is either tool-dependent, based on the XMI 







terms of the supported aspect adaptations, or consider only a restricted join point 
model. 
 
2.5.2.  UML Secure Design and AOM Relevant work 
 
One of the important set of applications that is driving the AOM methodology is 
designing and implementing secure software. In this section, we review some of the 
relevant work in this area. Harikrishna et al. [41] have proposed a complete framework 
for building secure software using the AOM approach, using SAM (Software Architecture 
Model) for specifying the base model and the aspects. Software architecture model use 
Petri-nets for modeling combined temporal logic. It also supports hierarchical models, 
which allows the modeler to change the level of abstractions. Join points are mapped to 
“connectors” in the SAM model. The work is still at a very conceptual stage and the 
adoption of modeling scheme, which is not very familiar to SW practitioners, might 
become a severe bottleneck. 
Matheson   et   al.   [42]   define   patterns   for   expressing   security   concerns   like 
 
authentication,  authorization,  and  data  privacy.  Security  concerns  are  not 
homogeneous.  Different  levels  of  security  may  have  to  be  enforced  for  guarding 
different assets and sometimes for the same asset as well.  Each concern is associated 
with a design pattern, which is represented using the class and interaction diagrams. It is 
possible to have alternate design patterns to address a particular concern. Catalog of 
design patterns are maintained. The order of composition of these patterns is very 
critical for proper functionality of the software.  The concepts have all been proposed at 







control. However, these concepts have not yet been mapped onto any particular 
technology for addressing the implementation aspects. Matheson et al. [42] address the 
issue of multiple independent aspects combined to form the application. One of the 
main issue addressed is the conflict of various aspects interacting with the main model. 
Process guidelines that are applicable in general to any AOM have been provided. These 
concepts can be adopted in various frameworks. 
Win  et  al.  [21]  have  successfully  defined  necessary  requirements  for  a  good  AOP 
 
environment: Definition of an easy and optimal design process, ability to monitor the 
performance of the various application modules even in integrated systems, support for 
testing and debugging,  which is complicated due to integration of the aspects into the 
application code, ensure no security holes in the process. AspectJ has been used for the 
development of AOP techniques. 
Doan et al. [25] describe the evolution of a formal framework for modeling design 
 
states. The authors propose a checker component to ensure that design state instance 
meet the constraints. They also extend the UML design framework with MAC, lifetime 
and RBAC constraints. Moreover, they developed a security satisfaction design program, 
which basically acts like a watchdog during the development process and gives 
information on the security requirements that are being complied with in the current 
design state. The same can be used in post-development in order to check compliance 
with a particular set of requirements. Such tools are very helpful when developing 







these  into  a  tool  framework  has  not  yet  been  implemented.  This  also  does  not 







Chapter 3 A Framework for Model-based Secure 
 
 
Software and System Engineering (MOBS2) 
 
 
The concept of AOM and its applicability or suitability to separate the cross-cutting 
concerns from the actual function in the context of security hardening has been 
introduced. A survey of the literature also revealed that there was no comprehensive 
tool, which could support all phases involved in the practical implementation of the 
above methodology [37] [43]. The MOBS2 programming environment was 
conceptualized to satisfy the above requirement of a comprehensive tool. In the 
following sections, the features of the MOBS2 tool suite are related to the phases of the 
proposed methodology. The MOBS2 project was a joint research project pursued by 
Concordia’s Information Systems department with Ericsson as the Industrial partner. 
 
3.1. Requirements of the tool suite 
 
 
In this section, the various phases of the development methodology are outlined and 
the required tool support for each of these phases is identified. As stated in chapters 1 
& 2, the key idea is the separation of concerns for the various non-functional 
requirements. Though the non-functional requirements are more add-ons they are no 
less important. Their deterministic and reliable operation would actually enhance the 
acceptability and usability of the functional package. 
In short, the requirement of the tool will be to support the AOM at a very high level. The 
tool was envisaged to provide the required support for various models of the system as 







define the system. The most used and preferred model among the structural models is 
the “Class diagram”, while the preferred behavioral models are the Activity diagram, 
communication diagram and the state machines. 
The mechanisms that will be provided in the tool are general enough to be applicable 
 
across the various models. In order to support the methodology at a minimum the 
following are required: 
    An unambiguous specification of conditions to define the pointcuts. 
 
 A method for identifying the positions, possibly multiple, in the base model where 
the conditions defined in the point cut are satisfied. This may need to be dynamically 
evaluated. The positions that satisfy the point cut conditions are defined as ‘join 
points’. 
    The additional/alternate functions that need to be executed at the join points, which 
 
are called “adaptations” to the base model. 
 
    Merging the “adaptation” models with the base model. This is called “weaving”. 
 









































Figure 9 – MOBS2 Framework Overview [37] 
 
 
3.2. Pointcut Definition 
 
 
The requirements unambiguously and precisely state the conditions that define the 
pointcut. This will make use of the phrases meaningful to the model space. However, 
another important point to note is that the security expert should not be burdened with 
the necessity of learning a new language for defining the pointcuts. 
The legal sentential forms are required to conform to a grammar. The legal sentential 
forms are then translated to generate an expression that conforms to the OCL 
specifications. A Java-based parser generator “CUP” is used to generate a parser for the 
defined grammar. This CUP parser generator takes the input as the grammar defined for 











In this context, the MOBS2 tool uses the pointcuts that are defined by using  “text 
string”, meaningful to the model, linked with each other using conditionals and logical 
operatives. The pointcut language used in the framework designates the UML elements 
in software design.   For example, consider the pointcut expression to designate a 
package ‘p1’ containing a class ‘c1’ as shown in Equation 1 




The OCL Expression equivalent to the textual expression is generated using the Java CUP 
parser. The CUP parser uses a well-defined grammar that helps translating the textual 
pointcut into the OCL expression that is required by the weaver. The generated 













The software system that is to be developed would be represented by a combination of 
structural  and  behavioral  models  of  UML.  The  structural  models  mostly  used  by 
designers are the ‘class diagrams’ and the behavioral models mostly used are the ‘state- 
machines’ and ‘activity diagrams’. This section represents the AOM profiles that extend 





















the modifications on the base model done by the aspects. In the MOBS2 framework, the 
AOM profiles are represented as stereotype packages as shown in Figure 10. Profiles 
have been created for the various UML models in the MOBS2 framework. The security 



























Figure 10 – AOM Profiles in MOBS2 Framework [37] 
 
As illustrated in Figure 10, the security profiles have been created in the MOBS2 
environment,  which  will  aid  the  security  architect  to  concentrate  on  the  ‘secure’ 
features that need to be designed into the application. The security profiles are 
generalized meta-models and are specified as stereotypes with tagged values and 
constraints. This enables the security expert to easily adapt the profiles to the particular 
application domain. The MOBS2 framework supports all the above model 
representations. Graphical representation and manipulation of all these models are 







3.4. Join Points 
 
 
The positions in the model instance under consideration, which satisfy the conditions 
defined as a pointcut is to be identified. A matching algorithm is adopted to define the 
positions in the base model to insert pointcuts. The algorithm takes in an “OCL 
expression”, which defines the pointcut as an input and scans through the model to 
identify the likely candidate points. The whole concept and the matching algorithm are 
quite general in nature and can be easily implemented to handle the various types of 
























Algorithm 1 shows a general implementation of how the process is repeated for each 
pointcuts specified in the aspect. On a larger system, each of the pointcut elements 







base model elements. Including this filtering mechanism in Algorithm 1 improves the 
performance of join point matching in larger systems. 
 
3.5. Transformation Tool & Weaving 
 
 
Figure 11 illustrates the detailed process of the framework. The adaptations will have to 
be invoked at specific points in the base model. The adaptation will be associated with 
pointcut definitions. A two phase process of identifying the join points in the base model 
(matching) and integrating the adaptations into the base model (weaving) is supported 
by MOBS2. The point-cut as indicated earlier will be specified using a “text” string. This 
string would be converted into an OCL expression. This OCL expression will then be used 
as the match string for the pattern matcher which scans the input model and identifies 
the join points. 
The transformation tool holds a set of transformation definitions targeting a particular 
 
UML diagram, and contains a set of mapping rules which defines the transformation of 
each element in the corresponding diagram. The transformation tool’s architecture 
facilitates extensions to cater to a wide range of UML diagrams by plugging in without 
modifying the existing architecture. The transformation tool uses the base model as an 
input, and defines appropriate mapping rules for specific diagrams using the underlying 
QVT engine. QVTO (Query, View, transform operational) is an OMG standardized set of 
rules and functions. This defines the way the base model will be modified and the 
appropriate adaptation is merged with the base model by transforming the base model, 









To use the MOBS2 tool, there are few steps to follow in order to use the weaving 
capabilities. The weaving process is organized into four steps: (a) Aspect specialization, 
where the application-independent aspect provided from the security aspect library is 
going to be instantiated and will produce an application-dependent aspect. (b) Pointcut 
translation where each textual pointcut defined in the aspect is translated into an 
equivalent OCL expression. The previous two steps can be considered preliminary steps 
before the actual weaving begins. (c) Join point matching, where the generated OCL 
expression is evaluated on the base model to identify the locations where weaving is to 
be performed.  (d) QVT transformation rules generation phase, which takes as input the 
set of identified locations from the previous step along with the set of adaptations 
specified in the aspect. It then selects the appropriate transformation rules to be 




















































Join Point Matching 
 


























Chapter 4 Additions of New Pointcuts and Advices 
 
This chapter elaborates on the steps taken to design new Join Points. The Join Points are 
designed for both structural and behavioral diagrams of the UML models. The new 
specifications as aspects help to further harden the base model to meet the 
requirements of the system. To precisely describe the additions and their implications, 
two example models common to the entire chapter are adopted. The models that are 
used are as listed hereafter. 
 
Bank ATM Base Model: The ‘Bank ATM’ cross section is the first model used as the base 
model for the whole chapter. The common example used to describe the additions 
made in the application and the implications of these additions. Figure 12 illustrates the 













The base model contains 3 classes : 
 
 User Class – The class contains the information pertaining to the user of the 
system 
 ATM – The machine that contains the system at the background. 
 
 Bank – The ATM and the user use the bank interface to perform transactions and 
then commit the changes to the appropriate user account. 
In the class diagrams just enough methods have been shown which when executed in 
the right sequence will enable the user to complete a transaction on the ATM. 
 
RBAC Security Aspect Model: The Second model adopted for this chapter is the Role- 
Based Access Control (RBAC) template as the security aspect model. The RBAC common 
template enforces access control based on user roles and permissions. It involves five 
key concepts – user, role, session, operation, and object [44]. Role represents a job 
function  with  certain  authority  and  responsibility  in  an  organization.  A  role  is 
represented as a relation between users and permissions, and a user assigned to a role 
acquires the permissions given to the role. Session represents an instance of a user’s 
dialogue with the system. A user can create or delete a session, and activate or 
deactivate a role in a session. A session may be defined as a mapping of a user to the set 
of roles that are activated by the user. An   object represents any information resource 
(e.g., files, databases) to be protected in the system. Operation is an access request to 
an object invoked in a session. Permission represents an authorization to perform an 







an object. Roles may be structured in a hierarchy to reflect an organization’s lines of 
 












createS ess ion(s : Session) 
deleteS ess ion(s : Session) 
as signRole(r :Role) 
Authorize (r : Role) 
UserAssignment GrantPermission(p: Permission) 
RevokePermi ssion(p: Permission) 
CheckAccess(obj: Object, op:Operation) : Boolean 
Add (r: Role) 
Delete (r:Role) 











addActive Role (r : Role) 
dropActiveRol e(r : Role) 
checkAccess( obj : Object, op : Operation) : Boolean 
invokeOperation (obj: Object, op :Operation) 
Permission 
 








Figure 13 - Role Based Access Control Template [37] 
 
In our approach we use Flat RBAC model as the security aspect. A Flat RBAC is the core 
model that embodies the essential concepts of RBAC: users, roles, and permissions. It 
specifies the assignment of users to roles and the assignment of permissions to roles. In 
order to enforce RBAC access control mechanisms on the different resources of our 
application, we need to introduce the primary concepts of RBAC to our application. In 
our approach, Flat RBAC template that depicts the essential structure and concepts of 
RBAC has been adopted. The security aspect model uses the AOM profiles defined for 
the weaver application. The AOM profiles define the model’s properties and depict the 
role that the model will play in the weaving process. Figure 14 shows the use of AOM 









Figure 14 – RBAC, Security Aspect Model 
 
 
As  illustrated  in  Figure  14,  the  AOM  profile  defines  the  RBAC  templates  as  an 
 
‘<<aspect>>’ stereotype. The stereotype forges the RBAC template to function as an 
aspect model to the weaving process. In a similar fashion, the RBAC template further 
incorporates stereotypes like   ‘<<classAdaptation>>’ ,’<<sequenceAdaptation>>’ and 
many more to specify the roles the classes play in the weaving process. These 
stereotypes provide the necessary property specification to the weaver application to 
perform the specific weaving to the base model. For example the  ‘<<classAdaptation>>’ 
performs only weaving on the structural aspects of the base model and weaves the 
specific security components in the system; Similarly, ’<<sequenceAdaptation>>’ 
performs weaving into the behavioral aspects of the base models. 
There are also stereotypes such as ‘<<add>>’,’<<pointcut>>’ and ’<<remove>>’ which 







be removed from the specified position. These stereotypes provide the appropriate 
property specification to the weaver application and allow the weaver to perform the 
directed weaving. The chapter is dived into 2 main sections. First section describes the 
additions made to the parser in order to generate the required OCL expressions that are 
used in the weaver application. The second section describes how the generated OCL 
expression used in the weaver application as inputs and how the additions affect the 
system. 
 




This section describes the additions and their implications on the parser. The Java-based 
CUP parser generates the OCL expression with a valid textual model as the input. The 
textual model is tokenized to pick the elements for the OCL expression. The expression 
built by the CUP parser is adopted as inputs by the weaver. To generate the OCL 
expression from the textual model a set of tokens comprised of the terminals and non - 
terminals in the model are defined. The definitions for such textual models follow 
Example 1 




As illustrated in Example 1, the textual model contains two tokens namely:  ‘class’ and 
 
’inside_package’. The tokens are circulated through the parser to create the OCL 
expression. Algorithm 2 depicts the generation of the OCL expression by the CUP parser. 







‘class’ and ‘inside_package’ are extracted from the string. These tokenized strings are 
then matched with the appropriate productions in the grammar in order to create the 
OCL expression. The resultant expression is utilized as the pointcut expression and in the 
weaver application. 
Input: PointcutExpr::= set (ClassPointcutExpr) 
 
Loop while (length (PointcutExpr)) 
 
if (PointcutExpr = Class) then 
 




if (PointcutExpr = InsidePackage) then 
 




Algorithm 2– Class Pointcut Expression 
 






The details of the additions are explained in the following sections. The parser presently 
caters for some Structural and Behavioral components of the model. However, in order 
to be able to express the new discriminants we need to update the parser to handle 
these newly defined structural and behavioral components. The components are 







system.   The   following   section   explains   the   additions   made   on   the   structural 
components. 
 
4.1.1.  Structural Components Enhancement 
 
This section describes the additions made to the set of structural components that the 
CUP parser handles. The structural components are comprised of the following: Class 
Diagrams, Objects diagrams, Deployment diagrams, Package diagrams, Composite 
structure diagrams and Component diagrams. 
 
The additions to the parser are illustrated using the new class diagram components that 
we are introducing. These additions affect the class/package section of the system 
structure. However, as these are only structural additions, the functioning of the system 
is not affected in any way. The additions are as follows: 
a.   Arguments (ARGS) Pointcut 
 
 
Arguments are items present in an operation as parameters. These arguments are used 
by the various classes to pass information (values) to the operations. To generate the 
appropriate OCL pointcut expression, the textual model expression should contain the 
token ‘arguments’, the addition of ‘ARGS’ along with the operation pointcut definition 
allows the parser to generate the OCL expression.  To accurately describe ‘ARGS’ the 
following example is used. 
( ) ( )
 









In Example 2, the textual model expression contains a class ‘ATM’ inside the package 
 
‘BankCrossSection’ that contains an operation ‘LogIn’, which contains arguments ‘iPin’. 
The parser examines the textual model expression and finds the ‘iPin’ argument. The 
token ‘cotains_args’ is adopted by the parser to generate the appropriate OCL pointcut 
expression. The parser implements Algorithm 3  to generate the desired OCL equivalent 














Algorithm 3– Argument Pointcut Algorithm 
 
As   depicted   in   Algorithm   3,   the   parser   checks   the   expression   for   the   token 
 
’contain_args’ in the class and the operation specified in the expression containing the 
required specific argument. The textual model expression must include a valid argument 
name specific to that operation. For the expression of Example 2 the generated OCL 
















The OCL expression [2] illustrates the generated expression which will be used as the 
pointcut expression in the weaver application for the item ‘ARGS’. The expression 
contains a class ‘ATM’ inside a package ‘BankCrossSection’ which contains an operation 
‘LogIn’ and a specific argument ‘iPin’. This generated pointcut expression is used as the 
 
input   the weaver application to identify and add a Join Point in to the base model. 
 
a.   Attributes (ATTR_TYPE) Pointcut 
 
 
Attributes are logical data values of an object. The parser searches for attribute tokens 
based on the attribute name in the textual model expression. The ‘ATTR_TYPE’ token 
allows the parser to search attributes based on the UML Property Types (data type) of 
the attribute, currently. The parser supports two UML property types: ‘Integer’ and 
‘String’.   The   data   type   in  the   textual  model  expression  has   to  contain  either 
 
‘DT_INTEGER’or‘DT_STRING’ to specify the type of the attribute. Using an example to 
described prominently the ‘ATTR_TYPE’ item. 
( ) ( )
 




In Example 3, the attribute ‘AccNo’ is of type ‘Integer’, the parser will use the textual 
model expression and generate the OCL expression; Using   Algorithm 4 the parser 
generates the OCL expression for the text sting with ‘ATTR_TYPE” specifier. 
As depicted in Algorithm 4, the parser checks the expression for ‘attr_type’ token 
specified in the class and the specific data type. The textual model expression must 





















Algorithm 4- Attribute Pointcut 
 










The OCL expression [3] illustrates the generated expression which will be adopted as the 
pointcut expression in the weaver application for the item ‘ATTR_TYPE’. The expression 
contains a class ‘ATM’ inside a package ‘BankCrossSection’, which contains an attribute 
‘AccNo’ of type ‘Integer’. This generated pointcut is used as the input expression in the 
 
weaver application to add a Join Point into the base model. 
 
These were the additions on the structural part of the CUP parser. To summarize the 
additions  to  the  structural  component  set  of  the  parser  expands  the  pointcut 
expressions that the Parser can generate in order to handle the new discriminants.  The 







this chapter. The next section discusses the additions to the set of behavioral 
components that are currently handled by the parser. 
 




The following section describes the additions to the set of behavioral components 
handled by the parser.  The behavioral components comprise the following: Activity 
Diagrams, State Diagram, Use Case Diagram, Sequence Diagram and Timing diagrams. 
The additions to the parser are illustrated using a sequence diagram. These additions 
affect the overall working of the application. A sequence diagram shows object 
interactions arranged in time sequence. It depicts the objects involved in the sequence 
of messages exchanged between the objects needed to carry out the function. The 
additions are as follows: 
 
a.   Lifeline Pointcut 
 
The lifeline is an instance of an object, it demonstrates the roles of different processes 
or objects that live simultaneously. Modification performed by the parser on the lifeline 
brings out changes in the behavior of the model. As mentioned earlier, the lifeline 
shows the instances of the classes that are involved in the interaction as objects. The 
textual model expression should contain ‘LifeLine’ artifact.  For example, the developer 
specifies in textual model expression the definition of a new lifeline representing the 










As illustrated in Example 4, the textual model expression contains ‘lifeline’ token. The 
parser will search for the token and then will generate the appropriate OCL equivalent. 


















Depicted in Algorithm 5, the parser searches for the ‘Lifeline’ token from the textual 
model expression and generates the OCL expression. For the mentioned, the generated 









b.   Message Pointcut 
 
A message conveys information from one instance, which is represented by a lifeline, to 
another instance in an interaction. This allows the specification of runtime scenarios in a 







expression.  The  parser  follows  Algorithm  6.  To  clearly  describe  the  algorithm,  an 






As illustrated in Example 5, the textual model expression contains ‘Message_Call’ token. 
The parser will search for the token and generate the appropriate OCL equivalent 
expression. The parser also adds the information on the type of the message call.   A 
message call can be one of two types: synchronous or asynchronous. Synchronous calls, 
which are associated with an operation, have a send and a receive message. A message 
is sent from the source lifeline to the target lifeline. The source lifeline is blocked from 
performing other operations until it receives a response from the target lifeline. The 
























As depicted in Algorithm 6, the parser searches for the ‘Message_Call’ token from the 
textual model expression and generates the equivalent OCL expression. For the above 
mentioned example the generated OCL pointcut expression is shown below 








OCL Expression [5]  listed above is adopted as an input to the weaver application with a 
 
message named ‘LogIn’. 
 
 
4.1.3.  Summary 
 
This section captured the effect of the modifications on the target application. However, 
at a low level structural and behavior changes only generate half the output. The parser 
is not responsible for weaving the aspects into the base model; these operations are 
completed by the weaver application. The parser generates only the necessary pointcut 
expressions in OCL, which are input into the weaver application. The modifications to 
the  weaver  are  made  at  the  application  level.  The  next  section  describes  the 








4.2. Enhancements of the Weaver Application 
 
 
The weaver application is responsible of performing the weaving of the aspects into the 
base model. The application includes two main components: Join Points Matching 
Module  and   Transformation  Rules  Engine.   The  join   points   matching  module   is 
responsible for querying the base model using the generated OCL expressions, and 
returning the appropriate set of elements that are validated. The process of weaving 
aspects into UML models is considered as a transformation process, the base model is 
being transformed into a new model enhanced with new (security aspect) features. The 
language used in the weaver application is the OMG standard application Query View 
Transformation (QVT). 
Transformation rules engine is executed on well-defined join points. A well-defined join- 
point constitutes a valid pointcut expression along with an ‘add’ or a ‘remove’ and a 
‘pointcut’ stereotype. The rules are implemented using the Eclipse Model-to-Model 
(M2M) plug-in, in the Rational Software Architect environment. The QVT black box 
mechanism allows the use of external functions along with the QVT language. As 
discussed in chapter 3, the OCL expression generated by the parser is passed into the 
Join Point Matching Module, which validates the base UML model against the OCL 
expression.   In an effort to increase scalability, the additions are performed to the 
application in both structural and behavioral sections. These additions help in increasing 
the security hardening process of the base models. 
The modifications on the application are divided into two sections; firstly the structural 
 







and package diagrams) of the base model. Secondly the behavioral modification that 
directs the security model to achieve workflow transformations (interaction and activity 
diagrams) on the base models. As mentioned earlier at the beginning of the chapter, 
two sample models, namely “BankCrossSection” and “RBAC”, are used to depict the 
process of performing security hardening using the new pointcuts and advices woven 
into the base model. 
 




This section describes the additions and their effects on the structure of the base model. 
The structural components in the weaver application comprises of the following: class 
diagrams, objects diagrams, deployment diagrams, package diagrams, composite 
structure diagram and component diagram. The additions to the application are 
illustrated using class diagram components. 
These  additional  components  increase  the  capability  of  the  developer  to  perform 
 
stronger security hardening on base models. However, these additions will not modify 
the workflow of the model. The following are some of the new ly added join points for 
structural  modification,  designed  in  an  effort  to  increase  the  degree  of  security 
hardening on the base model. 
 
a.   Arguments Advice Weaving 
 
The operation join point designed in QVT performs an addition of an operation in the 







Point  matching  algorithm  for  selecting  the   operation  specified  in  the   pointcut 
expression is presented in Algorithm 7 
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Algorithm 7 illustrates the process of weaving a new operation into the base model. 
The application begins my matching the join points with the base model according to 
the specified pointcut expression. If the specified join point is present, the application 
appends the operation into the base model as ’newElem’. The algorithm is designed to 
add new operations to the base model based on valid ‘class’ and ‘package’ elements of 
the base models. The algorithm is modified to accommodate the addition of arguments 
in the operation. The join point matching algorithm is designed to work around the QVT 
language restrictions. Essentially, ‘Operations’ and ‘Arguments’ are two mutually 
exclusive entities in UML models. The solution to work around constraint of QVT is to 
split  the  pointcut  expression  into  two  separate  expressions.  The  first  expression 
contains the class and package specifications and the second expression contains the 
specific operation and the arguments. The algorithm is modified in order to overcome 
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Algorithm 8 is  the modified version of  Algorithm 7, which allows the two mutually 
exclusive UML entities ‘arguments‘ and ‘operations’ to be used together to perform the 
join point matching with a given pointcut expression. The join point matching algorithm 
will validate the pointcut expression and weave a new operation into the base model. 
The algorithm can be appropriately described with an example. Using   Algorithm 8, 
generated pointcut expression for the arguments in an operation. The pointcut 
expression is divided into two separate expressions. The first part of the expression 
contains the class and package specification where the join point matching algorithm 
has to select the position to insert the aspect. The first part of the expression is shown 












The first part of the expression as shown contains the class ‘ATM’ and the package 
 
‘BankCrossSection’ specifications.   Algorithm 8 uses this first part of the expression to 
select the class and package from the base model.  The second part of the expression 







The separated pointcut expressions are validated. The validated expression creates a 
new operation that is to be woven into the base model. The modification on the 
operation allows the security developer to weave multiple operations with different 
arguments. The addition of arguments with operations supports polymorphism 
techniques in AOM and allows the developers to create complex designs. 
 
b.   Attribute Advice Weaving 
 
The parser generates a pointcut expression with attributes along with the UML primitive 
type (data type). The attribute can be of type either ’Integer’ or ‘String’. The weaver 
application allows the developer to weave attributes with a specific data type to the 
base models. The use of this addition to the weaver application can be precisely 














Example  6,  a  generated  pointcut  expression  adopted  by  the  weaver  application, 













Algorithm 9 – Attribute Join Point Matching 
 
 
Algorithm 9, describes the attribute join point matching performed on the pointcut 
expression. The Joint point matching module validates the expression and weaves the 
newly created attribute into the base model at the specified position. The attribute can 
further be specified as a static attribute by the weaver.  A static attribute is a statically 
allocated variable whose lifetime extending across the entire application remains 
constant. The static attribute contains the name and the data type of the variables. 
Weaving the static property into the base model allows the allocation of constant values 
that can be used throughout the application. The addition of attributes with data type 
and property allows the developers to incorporate static attributes into the base models 
that extend lifetime throughout the system. In highly complex and large models, usage 
of abstract classes is common. The addition of static attributes allows the use of 
inheritance properties in UML models, with different classes and packages inheriting 











This section describes the components added in the behavior section of the weaver 
application and their effects on weaving process of the behavioral components of the 
base model. The additional components alter the working of the base models and add 
the desired control flow into the existing one. For the following section, we use a 
common sequence diagram as an example to describe the effects of the behavioral 
weaving. Figure 15 depicts a sequence diagram that illustrates the communication 
involved between ‘ATM’ and ‘Bank’ classes. A sequence diagram shows the interactions 
between the instances of objects depicted as lifeline and the interaction between these 
objects known as messages. A sequence diagram shows object interactions arranged in 
time sequence. It depicts the objects involved in the scenario and the sequence of 


































The following are some of the additional behavioral components that are designed and 
added to the weaver application in an effort to modify the control flow of the existing 
base model. A sequence diagram depicts the control flow of the application. 
 
a.    Lifeline Advice Weaving 
 
A lifeline of an object demonstrates a role it plays in the control of the model. The 
object generates the actions and provides an in-depth analysis of the objects and their 
functions depicted in the model. The adaption is a part of a sequence diagram; we are 
adding a lifeline as an object that changes the workflow of the base model. The weaver 
implements Algorithm 10 to weave the matching join point to the base model. 





The pointcut expression directs the weaver application to add ‘User’, a new lifeline 
object, into the base model. 
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Algorithm 10 – Lifeline Join Point Matching 
 
The expression is matched with the sequence diagram of the system by the join point 
 







element is woven to the sequence diagram and the new object entry is added into the 
base model. The enhancements to the models add a layer of security hardening by 
defining a new role for the object. The addition of lifeline allows the developer to weave 
a security aspect as the new lifeline object that can change the behavior of the system. 
The addition of lifeline adds a structural advantage to the base model. 
 
b.    Message Advice Weaving 
 
A message depicts the method calls between lifeline objects in a model. Messages are 
used for communication between lifeline instances in an interaction. The weaver 
application inserts new message into the base model. To explain the working of the 
weaving process involved in adding new message calls into the base models Example 8 
is used. 








The message call ‘LogIn ()’ in the pointcut has to be inserted between interactions of the 
 
‘ATM’ class and ‘Bank’ class depicted in Figure 15 of the ‘BankCrossSection’ system. The 
weaver application implements Algorithm 11, to perform the weaving of message calls 
into the base model.  As Illustrated in Algorithm 11, the join point matching module uses 
the  pointcut  expression fed  into  the  application  and  selects  the  explicitly  specified 




































Algorithm 11- Message Join Point Matching 
 
 
The weaver application first determines the type of message call to be inserted, either 
 
‘Synchronous’ or ‘Asynchronous’ message call. If the pointcut expression specifies a 
synchronous message, the weaver creates a `send’ and a `receive’ message call pair and 
inserts both of them into the base model. If the pointcut expression specifies an 







and appends the new message into the base model. The message pointcut expression is 
fragmented into two expressions that separately define the source and the target, along 
with the name of the method that specifies the object usage.  The message advice 
adaptation adds method to specialize the roles the objects perform in the model. The 
message advice addition can be explained with pointcut expression Example 8. The 
expression contains an asynchronous call ‘LogIn()’ , the message call is woven between 
‘ATM’ and ‘Bank’ classes as depicted in the interaction diagram of Figure 15. The weaver 
 
application  weaves  the  message  call  specified  into  the  base  model  by  adopting 
Algorithm 11.  The addition of message call advice to the weaver application allows the 
developer to insert multiple secure message aspect components into the base model. 
This addition alters the workflow of the system, so that the developer has the ability to 





We conclude this chapter describing the additions made to the parser and weaver 
application  to  perform  weaving  on  the  base  model.  These  additional  components 
provide    the  developers    the  ability  to  specify  discriminants    by  allowing  them  to 
precisely change the structure and the behavior of the base model thus presenting him 
additional capability   for   designing and implementing   algorithms   which will offer 
higher degree of security to the application.  Developers are allowed to use techniques 
like polymorphism, inheritance, and abstraction. The developers can incorporate these 
techniques that are present in Object Oriented Paradigms (OOP) and Aspect Oriented 







The system hardened by the enhanced set of   security aspects at the design level itself 
increases the scalability and reliability of target systems. The implications of these 
additions to the application will be described in the next chapter that explains these 
enhancements with the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) communicator used as a case 
study. SIP [45] is a signaling communications protocol widely used for controlling 
multimedia communication sessions. The protocol defines messages that are sent 
between peers, which govern the initiation, establishment, termination, and other 
essential elements of a call (communication session). SIP can be used for creating, 
modifying,         and         terminating         two-party         (unicast)         or         multiparty 
(multicast) sessions consisting of one or several media streams. Other SIP applications 
include video   conferencing,   streaming   multimedia   distribution, instant   messaging, 
presence information, file transfer, and online games. The following chapter discusses 







Chapter 5 Case Study: Session Initiation Protocol 
(SIP) Communicator 
 
This  chapter illustrates the  suitability  and  the  effects of components added to the 
weaver application to perform security hardening on the base models. We show how 
security aspects can be integrated into a SIP communicator base model. Figure 16, 
illustrates the SIP communicator factory package that allows a multimedia application to 
use the SIP communicator protocol for multimedia communication sessions such as text, 
































Figure 16 – SIP Communicator Factory Package [46] 
 
 
The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is a signaling protocol used for establishing and 







designed for voice over IP and multimedia conferencing, and then was extended to 
provide support for other services such as instant messaging and presence management 
[47]. Today, SIP is also adopted for usage in 3G wireless networks, thus it becomes an 
integral protocol for ubiquitous environment. The SIP protocol defines the messages 
that are sent between peers. As stated earlier SIP can be used for creating, modifying, 
and terminating two-party or multiparty sessions consisting of one or more media 
streams. In this scenario, the SIP communicator defines a Factory package that allows an 
open source multimedia application to use the SIP protocol to create, modify, and 
terminate peers for the required sessions [46].  The depicted base model contains the 
following design patterns: 
    Peer provider pattern – This pattern defines a platform-specific implementation of 
 
the SIP protocol and provides the corresponding peer information specifics for the 
multimedia application. 
    Factory pattern – A factory is an intermediary pattern that encapsulates the method 
 
for accessing the SIP peer, and allows the application to obtain instances of the peer 
implementation classes. 
    Event Listener pattern – When the SIP stack receives SIP messages (requests and 
 
responses) from the network, the SipProvider passes them as events on to the event 
listener, which is called SipListener. 
In this scenario, the multimedia application starts the instance by preparing the sessions 
(text, voice, and video) between the peers using the peer provider pattern. Then, the 







Lastly, the application employs the event listener pattern to provide the SIP message to 
the designated peer. The application will use the package created by the SIP 
implementation package to initiate a request and send the request to the designated 
peer to avail a responding message from the peer. Figure 17 illustrates a cross section of 


























Figure 17 – Create New Message Sequence Diagram [46] 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 17, the multimedia application employs the ‘SIPFactory’ existing 
in the SIP implementation package to create a new message. The SIP implementation 
package creates a new message employing the interfaces: MessageFactory, 
AddressFactory, and HeaderFactory (not shown in the figure). The ‘sIPStack’ provides the 
properties of the session and the network. The ‘listeningPoint’ will use the properties 
provided by the ‘sIPStack’ to generate a new listening port for generate a new listening 







communicator is susceptible to threats over the IP network. . Table 3 illustrates the 
 
possible threats the SIP communicator is exposed to. 
 
Issues Solutions 
Eavesdropping – Unauthorized interception 
of voice packets, real-time media streaming 
and decoding hijacked messages 
Encrypting the transmitted data over a 
Secure Socket Layer with various 
encryption mechanisms 
Packet Spoofing – Impersonation of 
legitimate users while transmitting data 
Send   address   authentication   between 
peers 
Replay – Retransmission of a genuine 
message so that the device receiving the 
message reprocesses it 
Encrypt and sequence messages. 
Message Integrity – Ensuring that the 
message received is the same as the 
message that was sent 
Authenticate messages 
 
Table 3 – SIP Communicator Security Issues [45] 
 
 
In the following sections, we present our enhancements to the weaver application for 
weaving two security aspects into the SIP communicator base model: Secure Socket 
Layer (SSL), and Role Based Access Controller (RBAC). 
 
5.1. Secure Socket Layer (SSL) Aspect 
 
 
In this section, we show how the additional components designed for the weaver 
application allow weaving of Secure Socket Layer (SSL) aspect, and the Session Initiation 
Protocol (SIP) communicator base model. SSL is one of the most important components 
for online transactions, creating a trusted environment between the peers for 
communicating. The multimedia application employing a SIP implementation package 
must use the SSL mechanism to secure the communication environment for the peers. 







the threats shown in Table 3 in the multimedia application employing SIP implementing 
package. 
 
Before illustrating the effects of the weaving into the base model, we provide a brief 
description of the SSL aspect model. The Secure Socket Layer (SSL) is designed to make 
use of the TCP/IP network to provide a reliable end-to-end secure service. Figure 18 
illustrates the SSL aspect used in our approach. The SSL aspect includes: 
 SSLEngine: The SSLEngine includes encryption, decryption, and the handshake 
 
protocol mechanism. The SSLEngine is responsible of encrypting the transmitted 
data to mitigate eavesdropping and replay attacks. 
 CertificationManger:   SSL  uses   the   handshake  mechanism  to   validate   the 
 
certificates between the server and the client. These certificates allow all 
browsers to interact with secured web servers using the SSL protocol. However, 
the client browser and the server need certificates to be able to establish a 
secure connection. Allowing the use of certificates mitigates packet spoofing 
threat in the communication. 
 SSLSocketFactory: The socket factory is responsible for creating and terminating 
 
requests and responses between clients and servers. The SSLSocketFactory has 
two distinct entities: server and client. The client entity initiates the transaction, 
whereas the server entity responds to the client and negotiates to determine the 
SSLEngine that is to be used for encryption of the information in the session 
Figure 18 Illustrates the specification of the SSL aspect using the AOM profile presented 







Sequence Adaptation. The class adaptation adds a class named SSLEngine to the SIP 
communicator base model. In addition, it enforces the SSL concepts, of certification 
management, encryption and key management. Furthermore, the class adaptation adds 
two new operations, addAuthentication and addClientCertificate, to assign different 
encryption mechanisms and append various certificates used in the SIP-based 
communication  sequence.  The  sequence  adaptation  in  the  SSL  aspect  adds 
protocolcheck behavior ahead of any attempt to call sensitive methods. The 
protocolcheck behavior is responsible for checking and securing the communication 
session  between  the  peers  and  determining  whether  the  user  is  trying  to  send 
messages, or make voice/video call to other peers over the multimedia application using 







































After importing the SSL security aspects library specified above into the weaver 
application, the developer needs to customize the generic SSL aspects to suit the target 
application. This is done by mapping the abstract elements in the aspect into the actual 
elements in the developer's model; to achieve the mapping, the developer can use the 
Weaver Interface present in the MOBS2 framework. In this case, the developer will 
explicitly define the advices that are depicted in the weaving interface for weaving 
purposes. The additional components added to the weaver application allow developers 
to use polymorphism, abstraction, inheritance principles and weave them into the base 
models. The class adaptation in the SSL aspect weaves addSSLEncrypt operation, which 
is an operation with a specified parameter and weaves it into the SIP communicator 
model to perform secure message transmission between the peers. 
 




Having customized the aspects to actual elements from the application, the developer 
selects the instantiated aspect and the application model in order to perform the 
weaving. During the weaving, each pointcut element is automatically translated into its 
equivalent OCL expression using the pointcut parser component. This expression is then 
evaluated on the elements of the base model, and the matched elements are selected 
as join points. After identifying all the existing join points, the next step is to inject the 
various adaptations into the exact locations in the base model. This is done by executing 







expert. These mapping rules are then interpreted by the QVT transformation engine 
that transforms the base model into a woven model. Figure 19 and Figure 20 show the 
final result after weaving the SSL aspect into the service provider application base 
models. SSL aspect weaves class adaptation (SSLStructre) into the base model and alters 
the structure of the base model as shown below in Figure 19. The modifications on the 
base model are as follows: 
 
 addAuthentication: Weaves a class SSLEngine into the base model to include the 
encryption, decryption,  and handshake mechanisms into the SIP communicator 
base model. 
 addSSLEncrypt: Defines  an operation with a specified parameter and weaves it 
into the SIP communicator model to perform secure message transmission 
between the peers. 
 addKeyAttribute: Weaves the key pairs  as  an  static attribute along  with the 









Figure 19 – Woven SIP Communicator Model with SSL Aspect 
 
 
SSL aspect sequence adaptation (SSLBehavior) weaves many properties into the base 
model and alters the control flow of the base model as shown below in Figure 20: 
 addExchangeManager: This  aspect weaves a lifeline  object  ExchangeManger. 
 
The  ExchangeManager  is  responsible  for  the   exchange  of  the  keys  and 
certificates between the peers, and monitoring the secure environment over the 
communication in the SIP based communication. 
 protocolCheck: This aspect weaves the protocolCheck behavior message into the 
 
base model. This message is responsible for securing the environment before the 
peers  are  allowed  to  transmit  and  receive  data  over  the  IP  network.    This 









Figure 20 – Woven Behavior SIP Communicator 
 
 
5.2. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) Aspect 
 
 
In this section, we illustrate an access control over SIP based communications.  The 
usage of access control (UCON) [47] over SIP based communication will enable the 
prescribers to control the identification of their locations and approve or disapprove 
their subsequent connections, and to also set some parameters to determine whether a 
certain communication can continue or should terminate [47]. UCON can solve this 
issue by specifying policies that monitor the SIP communications before and during the 
call, message transmission, and video streaming. Moreover, it mandates and enforces 
continuous compliance to access conditions. In the case of noncompliance to these 
conditions, UCON provides mechanisms for revoking the access. Monitoring and 








Access control is the means by which the ability to access a specific computer resource 
is explicitly enabled or restricted in some way (usually through physical and system- 
based controls). With role-based access control, access decisions are based on the roles 
that individual users perform as part of an organization. In this section, a method of 
enforcing    access control on the SIP communicator base model will be described. The 
access control that is used is the RBAC model. In this thesis, RBAC [48] model is used. In 
order to enforce RBAC access control mechanisms on the different resources of our 
application, we need to introduce the primary concepts of RBAC to our application. 
 
 
Figure 21 – RBAC security model 
 
 
Figure 21 depicts the RBAC aspect model with AOM profiles that describe the 
adaptations that are used in the weaving process. The RBAC aspect model contains two 
kinds of adaptations; Class Adaptation and Sequence Adaptation. The class adaptation 







enforces the RBAC concepts, user-role assignment and role-permission assignment, by 
adding  two  associations  between  the  classes  (user,  role)  and  (role,  permission) , 
respectively. Furthermore, the class adaptation adds two new operations, assignRole 
and getPermissions, to assign different roles to users and to get their permissions. The 
sequence adaptation in the RBAC aspect adds the behavior message that checks access 
ahead of any call to a sensitive method. The check access behavior is responsible of 
checking whether or not the user who is trying to access a given resource has the 
appropriate privileges. The RBAC also adds the Action class to create specific actions to 
the application, which carry out the actions depending on the Roles specified by the SIP 
Communicator base model. 
 
5.2.1.  RBAC Aspect Customization 
 
The RBAC security aspects library is imported into the weaver application, the library 
can be customized by the developer to suit the target application. Mapping the abstract 
elements in the aspect to actual elements in the developer's model; to achieve the 
mapping the developer can use the Weaver Interface present in the MOBS2 framework. 
In this case, the developer will explicitly define the advices that are depicted in the 
weaving interface, for the purpose of weaving. The additional components added to the 
weaver application allow developers to use polymorphism, abstraction, inheritance 
principles and weave them into the base models. For Example, RBACStructure class 
weaves   addCheckPermission   operation,   which   is   an   operation   with   a   specified 
parameter and weaves it into the SIP communicator model to create specific access 







5.2.2.  Weaving RBAC Aspect 
 
The developers customize the aspects to actual elements in the model and the 
instantiated aspect and the application model are selected to perform the weaving. The 
weaving application automatically translates each pointcut expression to an equivalent 
OCL expression using the pointcut parser component. This expression is then evaluated 
on the elements of the base model, and the matched elements are selected as join 
points. The QVT transformation engine will interpret the QVT mapping rules specified by 
the security experts in order to incorporate the adaptations at the selected join points. 
The transformation engine transforms the base model by adding the selected join points 
to generate the woven model. 
Figure 22 and Figure 23; show the final result after weaving the RBAC aspect into the 
 
service provider application base models. RBAC aspect class adaptation (RBACStructure) 
weaves a variety of components into the base model and alters the structure of the 
base model as shown in Figure 22. The woven components on the base model are as 
follows: 
 addRole: Weaves a  class  ‘Role’ into the base  model to include  methods  for 
 
performing assignment of roles , granting access, and revoking access into the 
 
SIP communicator base model. 
 
 addPermissions: Weaves a class ‘Permissions’ into the base model to include the 
various permission granting and control mechanisms into the SIP communicator 







 addAccessController:   Weaves   a   class       AccessController       into   the   SIP 
communicator to enforce the access control mechanisms in the structure of the 
application using the SIP-based communication. 
 addAssignRoles,    addDeassignRole,    addGetRole,addGetPermission,:    Weaves 
operations into the SIP communicator base model to invoke specific method 
calls to create appropriate access controls to the specified roles along with the 
specified permissions between the peers and allow associated messages to the 
assigned peers. 
 addUserAgreement: Weaves  an  association  into  the  SIP  communicator  base 
 
model to enforce user-role assignment and role-permission assignments to 
structure  and  allow  the  role  assignments  to  create  a  Usage  access  control 




































RBAC  aspect  sequence  adaptation  (RBACBehavior) weaves  properties  into  the  base 
model and alters the control flow of the base model as shown below in Figure 23: 
 addCheckPermission: The  aspect weaves a  lifeline object  ‘Access Control List 
 
(ACL)’. The ACL is responsible for enforcing the access control in the SIP 
communicator by checking the permission to transmit data between the peers. 
The ACL also is responsible for granting or revoking access to the multimedia 
application employing the SIP communicator model. 
 addKillAction: Weaves the ‘destroy’ behavior message into the base model. This 
 
behavior message enforces the kill action concept of the RBAC to reject the 
access control before the peers are allowed to transmit and receive data over 
the IP network.  This message call is made to ensure the role base access control 















In this chapter, we presented the case study of SIP communicator to illustrate the 
feasibility and the effects of the new components added to the weaver application. In 
this case study, we demonstrated as to how our approach can be used to integrate the 
secure  socket  layer  (SSL)  protocol  and  access control  mechanisms  using  role-based 
access control (RBAC) aspect into the application.   These will help to secure the 
application from various attacks that tend to instrument user input in order to gain 









The  synergetic  and  rapid  growth  of  computers  and  communications  has  led  to 
connecting people and systems of the world with high-bandwidth digital data networks. 
The availability of inexpensive and highly performing computing elements has led to 
development of a plethora of products meant to improve the quality of life, which 
gather, communicate, and share a lot of information to achieve the desired ends. As the 
exploitation of these increases, not only will they be used in applications that control 
critical assets but will also gather and transfer valuable information. Application 
software, which control these gadgets and networks are being developed at a very fast 
pace. Often, the race to market the product leads to offerings which have serious 
shortcomings especially in the non-core functions, which are little appreciated by the 
general user. 
Security is  a  major concern in a  lot  of these  applications,  and measures are often 
 
brought in the final stages of the development, which leads to scattering of the security 
related functions all over the application code. This afterthought practice makes it very 
difficult not only to validate and verify their functionality and efficacy but also to 
maintain the code.  In this thesis, we have highlighted this problem. We have proposed 
a methodology and have developed the tools to facilitate systematic introduction of 
security measures into the application. 
The sheer volume of application programs required to be developed, has driven 
developers to embrace model-centric development instead of the traditional code- 







has been widely accepted. Aspect oriented methodology provides well-proven and neat 
methods of separation of functional and non-functional concerns in the development 
process. In the introductory chapter of this thesis, we have elaborated on the features 
of aspect oriented modeling, listed the UML models widely used by software developers 
and also explored their application domains. We have shown how adopting AOM 
techniques and applying them to the various UML models naturally defines a 
methodology, which lends to easily addressing crosscutting concerns like security. The 
major advantage is that this can be done without the need of having an in-depth 
knowledge of the application itself.     The  need for providing  high-level and 
comprehensive tools that enable security experts to operate in the model domain and 
focus on security measures without worrying about the low-level implementation issues 
has been discussed. 
A comprehensive study was done on the topic of the adoption of AOM techniques with 
 
UML models  for addressing the security  concerns and they have been cited in the 
chapter on literature survey. It was found that there is no comprehensive tool available 
for providing this high-level support in its entirety to the security expert. 
Definition and development of a model-based framework for engineering secure 
software (MOBS2) was initiated in collaboration with Ericsson Canada. The main focus 
of this thesis work has been to provide support in MOBS2 for definition of certain 
specific types of pointcuts, identify corresponding join points and incorporate the 
required advices at these points in the selected UML models: Class diagrams, Lifelines 







transform the base UML model to one with the advice weaved in it.  The efficacy and 
usefulness of these new security constructs were illustrated using two sample 
applications namely the SIP Communicator and RBAC. 
The key contributions of this research are 1) demonstrating how to build on and expand 
 
UML profiles to specify new security requirements as aspects over design models rather 
than as an after-thought; 2) offering guidelines to elaborate the model transformation 
rules that allow for weaving security aspects into UML design models at the very early 
stages of as well as throughout the various phases of the development life cycle; 3) 
illustrating how to design and implement the security aspects to UML models within 
Rational  Software  Architect  environment;  and  4)  validating  the  feasibility  of  our 
approach in the context of a variety of case studies, including in a banking transaction as 
well as  in  multimedia  communication environments to contend with and  resolve a 
variety of security challenges. 
Specifically,  in  this  research  work,  we  introduced  new  components  to  the  weaver 
 
application for specifying improved security hardening concepts to aid the integration of 
cross-cutting concerns, and security aspects into UML design models. We presented a 
detailed comparative study of the various techniques in security hardening of software 
design models. We highlighted that there is a clear need to provide security experts with 
a more expressive and generic AOM language for the specification of security hardening 
solutions on both structural and behavioral UML diagrams given a glaring lack of such 
capability at this time. As a result, we elaborated UML profiles, which allow the 







MOBS2 framework that currently employs the model-to-model transformation concept 
to efficiently automate the weaving process. In addition, we discussed UML-specific 
pointcut language to designate the main UML join points. 
The premise of this thesis work revolved around the need, motivation, and capability for 
 
designing additional components based on object-oriented principles. These principles 
allow the security experts to use along with their traditional modeling methodoly that 
results in an extension of the weaving process and allows the security expert to employ 
improved security hardening concepts. As noted above, we conducted case studies to 
demonstrate  the  effectiveness  of  incorporating  the  additional  components  to  the 
weaver application. Demonstrating the effectiveness of the additional components to 
the SIP communicator base model showed the improvement in security hardening 
concepts in both structure as well behavior of the SIP model. Using this research as a 
springboard, future research can examine how the framework and applications 
presented here can be further extended to accommodate more components that allow 
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